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1In order to understand a political revolution, It Is 
first necessary to identify and understand all of the fac­
tors and variables responsible for the process. The 1973 
overthrow of the Allende government in Chile was revolu­
tionary in that it signified a break with Chile’s long­
standing tradition of constitutional and democratic govern­
ments. To comprehend the significance of 1973 coup 
d' etat, it is imperative to study both the internal and 
external factors which led to the overthrow of the Allende 
government. In an historical analysis of an evern:, it is 
often easier to focus on one main cause rather than studying 
all aspects of the event. With Chile, it is extremely easy 
to villainize the United States overnment and the CIA and 
place the blame entirely on them. Although the United 
States government’s intervention may have been a catalyst 
for the coup, the internal politics and economic situation 
within Chile were, equally as important in assuring the demise 
of the Allende government. It is difficult to say which set 
of factors, external or internal, was ultimately responsible 
for the overthrow of Allende's government. Transforming a 
capitalist society into a socialist one is difficult in any 
situation. In Allende's democratic and constitutional 
framework, this transformation seems to have been
INTRODUCTION
2Impossible. As Simon Bclivar once said, "To understand a 
revolution and its actors, it is necessary to observe from 
very close and to judge from very far, extremes which are 
hard to bring together." In Chile, the combination of in- 




The political situation in the years preceding the 1970 
presidential election had a direct influence on the outcome 
of the election and the subsequent downfall of the Allende 
government. On the surface, the election of a Marxist can­
didate to the presidency would appear to he an indication 
that Chile was moving to the left. In reality, the 1970 
election did not signify an Important change in political 
sentiment, but rather, a breakdown of a tradition of coali­
tion politics.^ Without a full understanding of the vol­
atile political situation of the 1960's, one cannot fully 
grasp the political problems which the Allende government 
inherited,and could do little to eliminate. There are many 
reasons why the Allende government was destined to failure, 
but one of the most important was the breakdown of a polit­
ical system based on coalition and compromise.
Chilean politics can be characterized as a highly com­
petitive, multi-party system. Throughout Chile's democratic 
history, the political center has always been weak, which is 
characteristic of a polarized society.^ Until the 1970 
election, neither the left nor the right was able to achieve 
the majority necessary to win a presidential election
4without a coalition of a center group which had the support 
of either the left or the right/ Until the 1964 presiden­
tial election, this conciliatory type of politics was the 
accepted norm. In the preceding election (1958), Allende 
lost to conservative candidate, Jorge Alessandri, by a slim 
margin/4 Allende was a candidate of FRAP, a coalition of 
socialists and communists who rejected populism and advo­
cated Marxist reform/ The Christian Democrat /arty (PDC), 
which was formed in 1957 with a platform based on Christian 
socialism, ran Eduardo Krei in the 1958 election/ After 
the election, the Conservative Party (PN) supported Frei and 
the PDC in order to keep the socialists from gaining the 
majority in the next election/
In the 1964 election, the main difference between the 
PDC and the FRAP was that the former advocated peaceful and 
legal means to social reform, and the latter advocated revo­
lution if necessary/ The PDC rejected capitalist liberal 
democracy and promoted "commonitarianism,*' or Christian soc­
ialism/ Frei and the PDC also received strong support from 
the Catholic Church and the United States/^ Frei defeated 
Allende in the 1964 election by a seventeen point margin 
which was largely due to the support of the PN and the anti­
communist propaganda of the Frei campaign/^ Soon after the 
election, the Frei government alienated both the right and 
the left by attempting to become the partido unico, or only
5party.^ Frei frightened the conservatives, who believed 
that the PDC's social reforms were too drastic, while at the 
same time alienating the left by attempting to influence 
labor.^ Fret's greatest error was that he promised very 
specific social reforms that he could not deliver;and his 
"Revolution in Liberty" failed to solve slow economic 
growth, inflation, and unequal distribution of income.^
The Frei government actually increased foreign dependence by 
offering profit-remittance and liberalized import regula­
tions to foreign (especially U.S.) corporations.^ Although 
Fret's "Revolution" promised to elicit peaceful change, the 
PDC had to use considerable force to put down worker and 
peasant protests and to implement their programs.^ Another 
problem of the PDC was that they encouraged agricultural 
unions which ultimately inhibited the government's effec­
tiveness.^ The left incited farm seizures (tonas) by the 
poor and the right questioned the legality of agrarian re­
forms , ^ ^  Political analysts agree that the paramount fault 
of Frei and the PDC was their refusal to play the political 
game of compromise, which was necessary to run the country 
effectively.^ The polarity between the far left and the 
far right made it virtually impossible for any faction to 
compromise. The Christian Democrats occupied the unstable 
center position and alienated both the left and the right,
ft
which caused political hostility and increased the polarity 
between the parties.
In the 1970 presidential election, the political bar­
gaining necessary to win a majority had gone out of style.^ 
Both the left and the right had reorganized and become more 
set in their political views. In lQftft, the Conservative and 
Liberal parties combined to form the National Party (PN).^ 
The FRAP reorganized into the Popular Unity Party or Unidad 
Popular (UP), which was a coalition of communists, social­
ists, and some liberal members of the PDC,22 In his fourth 
and final bid for the presidency, Salvador Allende represen­
ted the Unidad Popular.23 The PDC ran Radomiro Tomic, who 
represented the more radical and uncompromising element of 
the PDC, and the PN ran an aging Jorge Alessandri•24 Unlike 
most centrist parties of the past, Tomic and the PDC refused 
to compromise and seek a coalition platform.
The recent and highly visible failures of the Frei 
government, combined with the PDC's reputation or being un­
compromising (prepotentes), made another Christian Democrat 
victory unlikely,25 Both the U.S. and the PN were confident 
that Alessandri would be the winner, but his age and lack of 
television appeal greatly diminished his chances.26 
Allende'8 victory demonstrated the polarization of Chilean 
society in that for the first time, a centrist candidate 
finished last.27 The election of Allende did not represent
7a shift in electoral patterns, in fact, Allende was able to 
obtain only 36% of the votes, Alessandri 35%, and Tomic 28% 
of the v o t e s . T h e  only radical aspect of Allende's vic­
tory was that it demonstrated the complete breakdown of a 
political system based on coalition and compromise.
Allende faced many political and social crises which 
greatly impeded the success of the UP. One of the problems 
that Allende faced was a total breakdown of the political 
bargaining which was necessary to run the country. Allende 
allied himself with the moderate faction of the UP which was 
composed of centrists, radicals and numerous other fac­
tions. The socialists in the UP had moved to a more rad­
ical form of socialism and away from populism^and they 
relied on Marxists and workers, and not on the centrist mid­
dle class, which in turn made the right more polarized and 
hostile. »31 Although the people had always supported the 
political extremes, they were willing to compromise and vote 
for a centrist candidate who would promise to support some 
of their interests. By 1970, this system was no longer the 
norm, *,nd Allende could not go back to a pre-1964 political 
milieu. The situation in 1970 was extremely hostile, with 
the executive, judiciary, and legislative branches all un­
willing to compromise. When Allende was elected in 1970, 
his victory worried the right, the army, and the United 
States government. Because Allende did not win a plurality,
8the election went to Congress, which was composer! of many 
Christian Democrats. The PDC and Congress rejected a U.S. 
sponsored plan to supercede Allende with Frei (through 
Alessandri) and agreed to elect Allende after certain con­
cessions were .nade.^2 Allende promised to uphold civil 
liberties, to guarantee the continuance of a multi-party 
s y s t e m ,  to insure free press, to accept an independent mili-
o o
tary, and to allow private education to continue.JJ The 
military did not prevent Allende from being elected because 
of tradition, internal divisions, some actual support of the 
UP, and fear of the repercussions of such an action.
Also, in Chilean society, the military was always thought of 
as the guardian of the Constitution and this tradition made 
the idea of a coup a very difficult one.^-* There are a 
multiplicity of factors which contribute to the breakdown of 
a political regime, hut in the case of the Allende govern­
ment, the internal political problems which he faced greatly 
contributed to his downfall.
Therefore, when Allende was elected, he faced a highly 
polarized and volatile political climate. Allende was a 
minority president, and he did not have a strong power base 
and could not run the government effectively. The political 
opposition presented many obstacles which impeded the success 
of the Allende government. Also, factionalism and ideolog­
ical differences within the UP caused many problems for the
9Allende government. The combination of factionalism within 
the UP, and opposition from other parties combined to make 
the failure of the Allende government inevitable.
Without the support of the PDC in Congress, the Allende 
government could not implement the majority of its programs. 
In 1971, the PN and the PDC joined forces in order to elect 
a representative to a vacant Congressional seat.*^ After 
this event, the coalition force of the PN and the PDC con­
tinued to block Allende*s economic and social reforms. One 
of the main reasons for the PDC's opposition was their fear 
of losing their power as a political p a r t y . T h e  Congress 
repeatedly impeached Allende*s ministers, thus demonstrating 
both their power and their dislike of the UP*s government.3** 
One of the greatest threats to Allende*s power was the PDC's 
proposed ammendment to the Constitution which would allow 
the Congress to control the economy.^ Allende vetoed the 
bill and it soon became clear that the Congress and the 
President could not work together.^ All parties involved 
realized that a compromise had to be reached in order to 
overcome the political stalemate. A series of talks in 1971 
were designed to eliminate the hostility between the govern­
ment and other political parties. When the centrist PIR 
left the talks, it became clear that no compromise could be 
reached.^ In 1972, secret talks were held with the hopes 
of finding a way out of the political deadlock. ^  The PDC
10
demanded that many public industries be transferred to semi­
private sectors, that the government should not intervene in 
private companies, and that the media should be privately 
run.^ Unfortunately, no compromise could he reached and 
the political turmoil continued until 1973.
The most serious political problem which the Allende 
government faced came from within the UP party itself. 
Immediately after the election, Allende was favored by all 
factions of the UP.^ Soon after, it became clear that the 
UP was not a homogeneous unit, but rather, a loose coalition 
of socialists, communists, and revolutionaries, all of vary­
ing degrees. The political competition and quota system cut 
efficiency and made it difficult to implement government 
policies.^ Workers would not take orders from managers who 
belonged to different political parties. The decentralized 
tendencies of the state made it impossible for the UP 
government to act quickly and efficiently, even when swift 
action was necessary.^ Within the UP, the socialists 
wanted more worker participation, the communists wanted 
worker ownership, and the MAPU extremists wanted an armed 
conflict to implement their policies. ^  Allende had little 
control over the officials who belonged to rival factions 
within the UP*and this disparate coalition caused many prob­
lems.^ Allende himself said, "there are more forces now 
supporting the government••.but its base has been weakened
Each factionby the internal problems of the parties.^ 
within the UP wanted preeminence and feared rival elements 
in other factions.^ As many political analysts have said, 
Allende was an adept politician, capable of handling day-to- 
day problems, hut unable to resolve any long-term con­
flicts.^ Many of the political problems Allende faced were 
the result of the inherent factionalism within the UP.
Transforming a capitalist society into a socialist one 
would be difficult in any situation. The political opposi­
tion Allende faced from within his own party was as strong 
as that of outside opposition. The Chilean people became 
aware of the inefficiency of the government as illustrated 
by an Ercilla poll of September 1972. In this poll, 43% of 
the people believed that the Allende government’s perform­
ance was poor, 36% thought it fair, and only 21% thought it 
was good.->2 Perhaps the main reason why the UP government 
failed was the inability of Allende to form a cohesive 
center upon which he could build his power. it is dif­
ficult to guess whether or not an improved political situa­
tion could have saved the UP government, or whether its 
failure was inevitable. It is clear that the combined oppo­
sition of other parties and of factions within the UP made a 
successful government virtually impossible.
One of the repercussions of this political tension was 
evident in the economy. Before Allende could introduce his
12
plans for a new economic system, he had to eliminate the 
problems inherent in the old system. Some of the economic 
ills of the Allende years were inherited, others were a re­
sult of his reform measures, and still others were caused by 
his lack of political control of the country. Many economic 
reforms of the UP directly benefitted the lower class, while 
at the same time benefittinp the country as a whole. The 
problems of nationalization, inflation, and political oppo­
sition all combined to create an economic situation which 
became impossible to control.
One of the first problems the UP government had to face 
was an unstable and unproductive economy. Allende and the 
UP wanted to stimulate the economy and to control inflation 
so that they could begin the socialist economic reforms.
The Allende government planned to aleviate inflation through 
price controls and to stimulate the economy by increasing 
wages,and thus increasing the purchasing power of the 
worker.^ The rise in wages would decrease profits for 
industry but would aid in the redistribution of income.^
The National Office of Industry and Commerce (DIRINCO) 
implemented these economic changes and soon after, results 
were visible. The gross national product went up by 13%, 
and unemployment dropped from &.3% to 3.8% in 1971.^ 
Although there were some positive aspects to the UP's 
economic programs, the consumer price index rnse from 598 in
13
1970 to 718 in 1971 Nevertheless, the UP's plan to 
improve national income distribution was successful in that 
the purchasing power of the lower classes rose.^
One of the HP's most important and successful plans was 
that of the nationalization of the copper mines. In the 
1970 election, both Tomie and Aliende supported nationaliza­
tion of foreign copper industries(which would allow profits 
to be used by the Chilean people.^ The UP government 
wanted to nationalize the land on which these companies sat, 
and the PDC wanted to nationalize the companies them­
selves.^ The disadvantage in nationalizing the whole 
company was that the Chilean government would have to absorb 
the debts of the old company and keep the same organiza­
tional structure of the previous c o m p a n y . T h e  nationali­
zation of the copper mines was a program that the majority 
of the people favored, but Aliende was willing to compromise 
in order to gain the support of the entire Congress.^ The 
main goal of the nationalization of the copper mines was the 
elimination of the power base of Chile's ruling class which 
had strong ties with the U.S. based c o m p a n i e s . T h e  UP 
also wanted to nationalize ownership of other key industries 
which were essential to the economy.^ The state wished to 
control the basic resources and the market of the country.
In this way, the state could control the basic resources 
which would enable it to plan an independent economy whose
14
prime objective was to provide goods to the people.^ The 
UP government paid the copper companies an indemnity which 
consisted of the net worth of the companies (Chuquieamata 
and Ki Teniente) minus the profits that the companies had 
earned since 1 9 5 5. ^  Even with these deductions, the 
Chilean government took a loss because of the poor economic 
state these companies were left in prior to Allende's 
inauguration.^ Although the Chilean government had to ab­
sorb the debts of the previous companies, they were still 
able to increase profits for the state. In the second half 
of 1971, copper production was up 2.5^.^ The idea behind 
the nationalization of the companies was successful in that 
it created a “new economy” which would provide a transition
to socialism.^
Although the economic changes of the UP initially 
worked, problems soon developed. The price control measures 
aided the poor in that they were able to buy more goods at 
lower prices, which increased the demand for these goods.^0 
Price controls and an increase in wages put more currency in 
circulation and the expansion of 11u money supply
caused inflation. ’ The government ws tld not fight infla­
tion at l He cost of the working class, but m m e  control was 
necessary • ^  The government derided to decal—* the escudo 
and to institute multiple exchange rates in order to control 
the consumption of non-essential goods.^
15
One of the main causes of Chile’s economic problems was 
beyond the control of the UP government. In 1971, the price 
of copper, which constituted 75% of Chile’s national ex­
change , fell from 70<f a pound, to a pound. ™  Another
problem which further exacerbated the economic trouble of
Chile was the United States' boycott of international credit 
and loans to Chile.™ All of these factors combined to 
cause inflation and food shortages which affected the middle 
class first, and then the lower classes. This created a
black market which in turn caused hoarding and speculation
by merchants and businessmen.™ Farmers were paid a set 
price for certain goods, so they either switched to goods 
that were not price controlled, or sold them through the 
black market.^ The government tried to combat the black 
market by using the police and public sentiment. The poor 
economic situation was not the only obstacle which the 
Allende government had to face.
Perhaps the greatest problem Allende faced was the op­
position from the Congress which was composed mainly of 
Christian Democrats. The tax reform bills which the UP pre­
sented were continually rejected by Congress in order to 
protect the wealthy interests, and to insure the failure of 
the UP.™ If the Congress had passed the tax reforms, the 
government would have had one source of revenue with which 
to control inflation, unemployment and the money supply.™
16
Although this problem was basically political in nature, its 
repercussions had a detrimental effect on the economy. The 
debate over taxes was just one area in which the UP was 
impeded by the PDC. Clearly, the Allende government did not 
have enough control of the economy to implement all of its 
socialist reforms.
Some of the economic problems of the UP government were 
inherited from the recession of the 1960’s.^  Others were 
caused hy the inflationary tactics that the UP government 
used to redistribute wealth. And still others were caused 
hy political opposition to many of the UP's directives. In­
flation, unemployment, and food shortages were just a few of 
the factors which contributed to the economic problems of 
the Allende government. The process of transforming a cap­
italist economy into a socialist one would be difficult in 
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The government of Salvador Allende faced not only in­
ternal problems, but external ones as well. Soon after 
Allende was elected, President Richard M. Nixon met with 
Richard Helms, the director of the CIA, and instructed him 
not to allow Allende to take power.^ This request was not 
inconsistent with the United States' previous actions in 
Chile. In 1964 the CIA enacted a "ruining campaign" to keep 
Allende and the Marxists out of office and this campaign was 
successful in that Eduardo Frei, a Christian Democrat, was 
elected.^ In 1970, Nixon feared a "red sandwich," that is, 
a Communist country in western South America, and Cuba in 
the e a s t . T h e  Nixon Administration used the CIA to help 
prevent Allende from taking office, and once he was in 
office, they helped create the political and economic 
tension which led to Allende's overthrow.
The Central Intelligence Agency's involvement in Chile 
has been the subject of much debate which will not be re­
solved for many years to come. Much of the information con­
cerning the CIA’s covert actions in Chil, from 1970-73, was 
obtained from a Senate Hearing concerning actions of the 
CIA.^ The link between the United States government and the
22
CIA was the 40 Committee, which is a sub-cabinet body of the 
Executive Branch whose purpose is to review major covert ac­
tions. It has existed under a variety of names since the 
1950's and since 1969, it has been called the 40 Committee. 
The Committee consists of the President's Assistant for 
National Security Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director 
of the CIA,-^  The 40 Committee, which was directly respon­
sible to the President, directed the majority of covert ac­
tions of the CIA from 1970-73. The covert actions of the 
CIA consisted mainly of directing funds to create political 
instability, anti-government propaganda, and a military 
solution to the problem of the Allende government.
The first directive of the 40 Committee was to imple­
ment Track 1, which consisted of allocating funds to promote 
propaganda and political unrest.^ Initially, Track I was 
designed to prevent Allende from being elected by Congress, 
but once he was elected, Track I continued to supply funds 
to rival political factions. On November 13, 1970, ten days 
after Allende was indurated, the 40 Committee approved 
$25»000 for the Christian Democrat party.^ Perhaps one of 
the most interesting characters in the Chilean espisode was 
Edward *ry, Ambassador to Chile from 1967-1971. Before 
Allende's victory however, Ambassador Korry asked for money 
to strengthen the political opposition to Allende. The
23
problem with the 1970 campaign was that the CIA and the 
President did not act soon enough, Korry, the man closest 
to the Chilean political situation, was the one man who 
foresaw Allende's victory. Unfortunately, not only were his 
warnings ignored, hut he was kept in the dark about most of 
the CIA’s activities,® The main problem with the political 
directive developed when President Nixon decided to support 
the Tightest candidate, Jorge Alessandri, and not the Chris­
tian Democrat candidate, Radomiro Tomic, Korry vehemently 
disagreed, predicting that supporting the far right would 
split votes and allow Allende to ’‘sneak in."^ Henry 
Heckscher, the Chief of Station of the CIA in Chile, also 
supported the PN and Alessandri.^ Heckscher suggested to 
Nixon and the 40 Committee that the political effort should 
be entirely anti-Allende, and remain indifferent as to a 
winner. The problem with this compromise plan (as Korry 
knew) was that it was difficult to beat somebody with no­
body. ^ ^
Another aspect of the CIA's efforts to create a polit­
ical solution to the election involved multinational comp­
anies. Although Korry warned U.S. companies not to support 
Alessandri, many still did. John McCone, former DCI and 
current board member of ITT, met with Helms to discuss fund­
ing of an anti-Allende campaign. ITT offered the CIA $1 
million to attempt a pro-Alessandri effort.^ ITT was
24
concerned about protecting the $95 million holdings in Chile 
and was willing to contribute significantly to the pro- 
ject. J Although a pro-Alessandri campaign was rejected by 
the State Department, Korry, and the President, McCone 
believed that Helms might go ahead with a pro-Alessandri 
campaign anyway. ^  In truth, the CIA did give ITT lists of 
people through which they could channel funds.^ What this 
means is that the CIA supported a policy which the United 
States rejected. Before the election, the the prophetic 
Korry wanted a pre-election poll. The CIA composed a poll 
in which Alessandri had 42% of the votes.^ Korry still had 
doubts, which proved to be true, and on September 4, 1970, 
Salvador Allende received 36*, Alessandri 34%, and Tomic 27% 
of the votes . ^ ?
The reaction to Allende's victory was total panic.
Once everyone had regained \\\S composure, a new plan for a 
political solution was devised. The so-called "Rube 
Goldberg" plan focused on a comprehensive set of political 
maneuverings which consisted of Frei resigning and his vice 
president succeeding him and then having the Congress re­
elect Frei as president.^ This plan railed because Tomic 
and the PDC had already agreed to support an Allende 
victory.^ ^
Once Allende was inaugurated, the CIA changed its plan 
for a political solution to the Allende problem. The new
plan consisted of allocating funds in order to escalate the 
tensions in Chilean politics. In late November, 1970, the 
40 Committee approved $750,000 for covert political action 
in Chile, hut the money was not allocated until January 
1971.^ Between March rind July, the Committee approved over 
$700,000 of aid to the PDC in hopes that it would win most 
of the open congressiona1 seats, thus creating more polit­
ical tension. Nc>t only A id the CIA aid opposition 
parties, it also allocated $50,000 in an effort to splinter 
the UP coalition.^2 Qn October 26, 1972, the 40 Committee 
approved $1,427,666 to support opposition leaders in the 
1973 Congressional elections. The CIA also caused instabil­
ity by channelling funds to private citizens who were op­
posed to the Allende government. In 1972, the 40 Committee 
allocated money to private citizens who in turn promoted 
various strikes such as the shopkeeper’s strike of August 
1972 and the Confederation of Truck Driver^' strike in 
October 1972.^ These actions severely impeded the Chilian 
economy and this situation was further exacerbated by 
economic aid to opposition groups. The attempts of the CIA 
to prevent Allende from gaining office through political 
maneuvering failed. The CIA's secondary plan to create 
political tension was more effective in eliminating 
Allende. Clearly one of the main strategies the CIA employ­
ed, was meant to eliminate Allende through political means.
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Not only Hid the CIA employ political tactics in Chile, 
they also used propaganda efforts to eliminate Allende.
This propaganda effort began to take shape after Allende was 
elected. In January, 1971, the 40 Committee approved 
bl,240,000 in order to buy newspapers and radio stations 
which would support opposition to Allende. In September of
1971, the 40 Committee approved $700,000 for the support of 
El Mercuric, a major anti-Allende newspaper.2^ On April 11,
1972, the Committee allocated $50,000 in an effort to give 
additional support for El Mercurio.2^
The mass media play a significant role in influencing 
the attitudes of a society. During the Allende years, the 
press represented a diverse and multifarious array of 
opinions. Unlike most socialist states, the Allende govern­
ment did not control and censor the press, which allowed 
many anti-government newspapers to flourish. The largest 
and most widely read periodical, El Mercurio, was able to 
coalesce many anti-government factions.26 Although the 
press espoused political doctrine, it was not necessarily 
supported by any political party. The media did not always 
portray politician views accurately and the politicians 
were forced to rely on an unreliable means of communica- 
tion. Although government harassment of the media varied 
with the means of communication, on the whole, the media was 
allowed to express its own political views.
El Mercurio offers a pood example of an opposition 
paper that was allowed to express anti-government sentiment
with minimal interference. The 40 Committee of the CIA 
allocated $1.5 million to aid El Mercurio ^  Even without 
the United States' support, the feud between Allende and El 
Mercurio would have produced the political tension evident 
in the daily press. Unlike such periodicals as Tlzona and 
Patria y Llbertad, El Mercurio never openly advocated mili­
tary takeover of the Allende government•^9 The approach of 
El Mercurio was more subtle and indirect. The newspaper's 
readers were mostly upper and upper middle class profes­
sionals, as evidenced by the advertisements within the 
paper. El Mercurio attacked the Allende government on two 
main areas--politics and freedom of expression.
In 1972, El Mercurio repeatedly ran front-page stories 
about the Communist Party's attempt to infiltrate the mili­
tary and create a civil war.30 The editors heightened the 
tension in the Congress between Allende and the opposition 
parties. The editor reiterates the point that the opposi­
tion is a majority (mayoria) and that it represents the 
opinions of the majority of the people.^ El Mercurio 
devotes many pages of print to the Senate hearings and de­
bates, which implies that they are closely watching the 
political scene.32 In every edition, an ad appears which
advocates opposition to the nationalization of certain
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industries such as paper, fishing, meat, and many others.
The PDC ads for the Associacfon de Ahorro y Pres tamo 
advocate opposition to the nationalization of the 
banks.33 All of the ads equate nationalization with the 
loss of freedom, loss of profits, increased government 
control, and loss of power for the workers. The political 
tension in Chile is evident in every issue of El Mercurio. 
The opinions and speeches of members of the Congress and the 
PDC and other opposition leaders were printed every day. 
Stories of tonas, or land seizures repeatedly made the front 
page along with pictures of farmers being thrown off their 
land.34 in 1973, the political attacks against the Allende 
government became more blatant and direct. Ex-president 
Frei is quoted as saying that the Allende government is 
heading towards a totalitarian state.35 The unstable 
relationship between the political parties was further 
exacerbated by the constant attention that was drawn to it 
in El Mercurio.
Although El Mercurio was closed only once by the 
Allende government, the editors constantly stated that they 
were afraid that Allende would shut down their presses.36 
This fear was ungrounded, since Allende never threatened to 
shut down El Mercurio.3? The editors expressed a belief 
that they were being persecuted by the UP^  and that they 
would nonetheless continue to fight for the truth.38 The
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editors expressed disdain for La Manana, which was the of­
ficial paper of the UP.**9 During the Allende years, there 
were eleven daily papers in Chile.^ The television media 
was more strictly controlled than the newspaper media. Two 
of the three channels were in effect, UP controlled.^1 In 
1973, El Mercurio ran ads opposing the nationalization of 
the major paper supplier, La Papelera. The ex-president of 
La Papelera was Alessandri, therefore this takeover was more 
political t > m o s % ^  El Kercurio and other anti-govern­
ment papers were fearful that if the government controlled 
the paper supply, that they would he able to drive them out 
of business as Peron had done in Argentina. ^  Although 
tht e were attempts to harass the anti-government presses 
with lawsuits, the government did not threaten to shut down 
the presses on political grounds.^ The editors of El 
Mercurio implied that once the opposition press was shut 
down, fascism and the end of all elections would occur. ^
The operation of opposition presses in a socialist 
society is an unique occurrence. El Mercurio used emotional 
and political propaganda to create opposition to the govern­
ment. Allende*s insistence on allowing freedom of the press 
created an atmosphere full of political tension. El 
Mercurio was one of the most widely circulated newspapers
and it obviously swayed public opinion against Allende.
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This negative public attitude was one of the contributing 
factors which led to Allende*s downfall.
The press was just one area in which the United States 
government was able to supplement the animosity between 
existing factions in Chile. The CIA channelled funds to an 
organization which they knew could effectively cause fact­
ionalism within Chilean society.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the United States* 
involvement in Chile is the CIA*s attempt to prevent Allende 
from taking office through military means. Although the 
United States did not send troups, military advisers, etc. 
to Chile, it did pass money, through the CIA, to help gen­
erate a military plan to keep Allende out of office.
Although at this time no evidence is available to suggest 
that the CIA was directly involved with the 1973 coup, there 
is much evidence concerning the CIA*s involvement in a coup 
attempt in 1970.
At the same time that Ambassador Korry was attempting 
to negotiate the Rube Goldberg (Track I) Plan, Kissinger, 
Nixon, Helms, and Heckscher were working on a plan to help 
the military overthrow the government. This phase of the 40 
Committee plan was known as Track II and it involved a 
direct effort to use the Chilean military to prevent Allende 
from taking office.^ Unfortunately, this plan rested on 
two generals, Viaux and Valenzuela, who were both unstable
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and ineffective. As Kerry once said to Kissinger, "Only an 
insane person would work with a man like V i a u x . G e n e r a l  
Viaux and General Valezuela were planning to remove the one 
obstacle to a military takeover. General Rene* Schneider, 
the Commander in Chief of the Chilean armed forces, firmly 
opposed any military intervention in the political arena. 
Finally, on September 15, 1970, Mitchell, Kissinger, Nixon, 
and Helms held a meeting to discuss possible means of assis­
tance to Viaux. Nixon was intent on overthrowing Allende at 
all costs, and although everyone there knew that a coup was 
irrational and implausible, Helms and Kissinger went along 
with the idea a n y w a y . T h e  plan centered around using 
Colonel Paul Wimert, a defense attache, to keep in contact 
with Viaux and Valenzuela and tell Helms of their actions.^ 
Wimert gave the Chilean military men tear gas, 45 caliber 
submachine guns, and grenades, all of which were obtained 
from the CIA. The plan consisted of kidnapping General 
Schneider, and then forcing President Frei to submit to the 
military in order to gain the release of Schneider. This 
plan failed miserably, and Schneider was killed in the at­
tempt. Since Schneider was killed with a handgun, the CIA 
believed that they would not be implicated in the plot.
Viaux and Valenzuela were given money by the CIA, and 
promised more if the coup was successful•^  The coup 
attempt was a complete failure and on October 24, 1970,
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Allende was inaugurated as President of Chile.^ Kissinger 
and Nixon blamed Helms for not having the correct intelli­
gence information and for not taking a more active role in 
the Schneider kidnapping. Although Ambassador Korry was 
suspicious of the CIA, he was totally unaware of the coup 
attempt for many years. Kissinger and Nixon blame problems 
on communication and intelligence and claim that they had no 
idea that Helms was involved with a coup attempt.
The coup attempt is important in itself because it dem­
onstrates the extent of United States* involvement in Chile. 
It is difficult to discern who was responsible for the 
Schneider affair, the CIA, the 40 Committee, or Nixon 
himself. If there are any rules which the Central Intel­
ligence Agency lives by, it would have to be these two-- 
never reveal secrets, and never write anything down on 
paper. Needless to say, it is difficult and perhaps impos­
sible to know the full extent of the CIA's military involve­
ment in Chile. Richard Helms, the Director of Central 
Intelligence (DCI) from 1966 through 1973, was a firm 
believer that his main function was to serve the Presi­
dent.^ on February 7, 1973, Helms was indicted for perjury 
because of his statements at a Senate Committee hearing.
Symington (to Helms): Did you try in the CIA
to overthrow the government in Chile?
Helms: No, sir.
Symington: Did you have any money passed to
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the opponents of Allende?
Helms: No sir.
Symington: So the stories you were involved
in that are wrong?
Helms: Yes, sir.5**
As stated earlier, these statements proved to be false.
Helms justified his prevarication by claiming that the 
senators present at the hearings were not authorized to hear 
this information. As a noted aid of Helms once said, "Helms 
told the truth, but not the whole truth.”55 it was not 
until 1975 that Helms was finally forced to tell the truth 
about the CIA's pre-Allende activities.^  Helms claims that 
the CIA did not give funds directly to opponents of Allende, 
and that their main purpose was to prevent Allende from 
coming to power, not to overthrow the Chilean government.
Whether or not the CIA directly or indirectly tried to 
prevent Allende from taking office by promoting a coup is 
not the point. The most important fact is that the United 
States attempted to prevent the confirmation of a legally 
elected president. With regards to the 1970 election of 
Allende, Helms failed in his duty. Through a combination of 
factors, many of which he had no control over, Salvador 
Allende became the first elected Marxist president in the 
history of the American continent.
Understanding the motives and objectives of the United 
States'military, political and social involvement in Chile 
is extremely difficult. To some, the covert actions of the
34
United States government were unjust, illegal and immoral, 
while to others, they were a means to guarantee national 
security. The official justification for the CIA's involve­
ment in Chile comes from sources who have a vested interest 
in providing a specific point of view and is not in any way 
representative of the entire scope of opinions on the sub­
ject.
The officials of the United States government claim 
that they act in the best national interest, which is osten­
sibly dictated by the President. In Henry Ki ssinger's 
memoirs, White House Years, the author justifies the United 
States' role in Chile during 1970. Kissinger contends that 
Allende's victory was dangerous for both the United States 
and Chile, and he focuses his arguments on these two points. 
Kissinger states that "Allende represented a break with 
Chile's long democratic history and would become President 
not through an authentic expression of majority will but 
through a fluke of the Chilean political s y s t e m " . T h i s  
statement clearly shows Kissinger's lack of knowledge of 
Chile's multiparty system. Few presidents have won a 
majority in any previous election, and in 1958, Alessandri 
won with a lower percentage of votes than Allende had in 
1970.59
Kissinger continually suggests that the United States' ac­
tions were in the best interests of the Chilian people. He
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s t a t e s  "It w a s  a c e n t r a l  t e n e t  o f  * h e  p a r t y ' s  f U P ' s ]  p r o g r a m  
that " b o u r g e o i s "  d e m o c r a t i c  p r a c t i c e s  w o u l d  he m a d e  
i r r e l e v a n t ,  b y  d e f i n i t i o n  h i s  w o u l d  he the last d e m o c r a t i c
) l £ A
e l e c t i o n ,  T h e r e  is a l o g i c a l  f a l l a c y  w i t h i n  this
s t a t e m e n t  in t h a t  t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  " b o s g c u i a "  d e m o c r a t i c  
p r a c t i c e s  ( w h a t e v e r  t h e y  m a y  be), d o e s  not n e c e s s a r i l y  lead 
to the e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  e l e c t i o n s .  T h i s  t h e o r y  is e a s i l y  
discounter! b y  (he fact that A l l e n d e  " p e r m i t t e d "  m u n i c i p a l  
e l e c t i o n s  in w h i c h  ( d e s p i t e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s *  e f f o r t s )  the UP 
w a s  a b l e  to g a i n  m o r e  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r .  P e r h a p s  the g r e a t e s t  
a b s u r d i t y  of K i s s i n g e r ' s  s t a t e m e n t  || to In the fact that 
A l l e n d e  d i d  not h a v e  the p o w e r  to f o r b i d  e l e c t i o n s - - h e  
c o n t r o l l e d  n e i t h e r  the C o n g r e s s  n o r  the m i l i t a r y .  K i s s i n g e r  
c l a i m s  that r h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a c t e d  w i t h  an a J t r n / a t f c  
i n t e n t  in p r o m o t i n g  c o v e r t  a c t i v i t i e s  b e c a u s e  t h e  C h i l e a n  
p e o p l e  w o u l d  b e  b e t t e r  o f f  wit h o o t  the A l l e n d e  g o v e r n m e n t .  
K i s s i n g e r  n e v e r  a t t e m p t s  to e x p l a i n  h o w  o n e  t a n  j u s t i f y  
o v e r t h r o w i n g  a d e m o c r a t i c a 1 1 y e l e c t e d  p r e s i d e n t .
P e r h a p s  the real r e a s o n  for K i s s i n g e r ' s  a h d  N i x o n ' s  
a c t i o n s  c o m e s  f r o m  t h e  t h r e a t  the A l l e n d e  g o v e r n m e n t  p o s e d  
to U n i t e d  S t a t e s  h e g e m o n y  in t h i s  c o n t i n e n t .  K i s s i n g e r  
s t a t e s  that t h e  C h i l e a n  c r i s i s  o c c u r r e d  at t h e  s a m e  t i m e  as 
the C i e n f u e g o s  i n c i d e n t  a n d  a m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  o t h e r  n a t i o n a l  
c r i s e s  m a g n i f i e d  t h e  t h r e a t  o f  C h i l e . C h i l e  w a s  e v e n  m o r e  
d a n g e r o u s  t h a n  C u b a  in t h a t  it w a s  a c o n t i n e n t a l  c o u n t r y  a n d
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c o u l d  e a s i l y  i n f l u e n c e  ( d o m i n o  e f f e c t )  o t h e r  S o u t h  A m e r i c a n  
c o u n t r i e s . 6 '* T h e  f o r m e r  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  a l s o  s t a t e s  that 
the p r e v i o u s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  (K e n n e d y / J o h n s o n ) h a d  g lVen 
funds to the PDC, and that N i x o n ' s  p o l i c y  w a s  n o t  at all 
u n u s u a l . 6 J  I m m e d i a t e l y  a f t e r  All end#/* e l e c t i o n ,  N i x o n  f o l d  
P f e h a r d  H e l m s ,  I be ill r e c t o r  of t h e  CIA, " t o  m a k e  t h e  e c o n o m y  
s c r e a m / '  so tha t  the " R o h e  C o M h e r g  p l a n  c o o ’d he u n d e r -  
I a k / n #6 * /fo R u b e  ho Ldhe f y  p l a n  s a n  r e p o r t e d l y  N i n o n ' s  m a i n  
o b j e c t i v e ,  and  j t c o n s i s t e d  o f  rft* Cftilean
C o n g r e s s  to e l e c t  Alessartdrf , a n d  * o t h ^ c  n r e p  ,
thus a l l o w i n g  Alleride a n d  Pre, «.o h a * *  *  t w o - w a y  run o f f  
r a c e . 6 *’ ( T h e r e  are a f e w  v a r i a n t *  to e h e  C o ! d h # r g
Plan " )  T h e  w h o l e  p u r p o s e  of this p ^  was ro ali >w Rrei 1 > 
be e l e c t e d ,  t h u s  a l l o w i n g  a ^ e a # ^ n # h j e  catv^'rf*r e to r u l e  
C h i l e .  A l l  o f  t h e s e  m a n  1 pul a t i o n «  w e r e  d e s i g n e d  to pr er# 
the U n i t e d  N t a t e s '  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y .
K i s s i n g e r  a l s o  e x o n e r a t e d  h i m s e i f  a n *  a i x o n  f/<a» y 
w r o n g d o i n g  w i t h  r e g a r d s  to the 4 0  C o m m i t t e e ,  w h i c h  *’ re ' t e d  
t h e  C I A ' s  a c t i v t l l e g  In C h i l e .  K i s s i n g e r  c i a o  * that ?yar k 
I was to h e  c o n t r o l l e d  b y  t h e  4 0  C o m m i t t e e ,  a n d  T r a c k  I f  m §  
t o  h e  c o n t r o l l e d  b y  the P r e s i d e n t  hin c e l f . 66 T h i s  is in 
d i r e c t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  w i t h  I lie S e nnit noggpitr#* R e p o r t  ( w h i c h  
K i s s i n g e r  c a l l s  " t e n d e n t i o u s " ; a h f r h  s t a t e s  that the only 
d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  T r a c k  I a n d  T r a c k  II, w e r e  t h a t  T r a c k  1 
d e a l t  w i t h  p r o p a g a n d a  a n d  e c o n o m i c  s a n c t i o n s  a n d  a c t i o n s ,
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a n d  T r a c k  II d e a l t  w i t h  m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n * ? . ^  K i s s i n g e r  
d e n i e s  a n y  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  S c h n e i d e r  k i d n a p p i n g  a n d  
c l a i m s  t hat t h e  C I A  a c t e d  w i t h o u t  a n y  a u t h o r i t y . ^  H e n r y  
K i s s i n g e r  s t a t e s  that a l t h o u g h  the 4 0  C o m m i t t e e  a p p r o p r i a t e d  
f u n d s  a n d  m a d e  d e c i s i o n s ,  no n i e  r e a l l y  m o n i t o r e d  the a c t i ­
v i t i e s  of the I A . ^  He a l s o  s t a t e s  that T r a c k  IT w a s  t r i g ­
g e r e d  by an e m o t i o n a l  o u t b u r s t  o n  N i x o n ' s  p a r t  a n d  that it 
w a s  not m e a n t  to he t a k e n  s e r i o u s l y . ^  N i x o n  h i m s e l f  d e n i e s  
a n y  k n o w l e d g e  o f  the S c h n e i d e r  k i d n a p p i n g  a n d  j u s t i f i e s  all 
his a c t i o n s  w i t h  r e g a r d s  to C h i l e . ^  K i s s i n g e r  d o e s  a d m i t  
that, t > e 40 C o m m i t t e e  i n s t r u c t e d  A m b a s s a d o r  K o r r y  to a p ­
p r o a c h  the C h i l e a n  m i l i t a r y  a n d  to c o n v e y  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  
d e s i r e  for a n e w  e l e c t i o n . ^  K i s s i n g e r  s t a t e s  that the C I A  
a u t h o r i z e d  to p r o v i d e  e c o n o m i c  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  s a n c t i o n s ,  
oat not a l l o w e d  to u s e  m i l i t a r y  m e a n s  to p r e v e n t  A l l e n d e ' s
* f * c M o n . ^  This statement: is in d i r e c t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  to r e p o r t s  
b y  p e o p l e  w h o  w e r e  d i r e c t l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  K i s s i n g e r . ^
K s s i n g e r  s t a t e s  that p i p e l i n e  s h i p m e n t s  to the C h i l e a n  
m i ] ) i a r y  w e r e  r e s u m e d  b e c a u s e  t h e  C h i l e a n s  w e r e  r e c e i v i n g  
weafo/is f r o m  the U S S R ,  but h e  c i t e s  no r e f e r e n c e  to 
c o l l a b o r a t e  t h i s  statement. P e r h a p s  t h e  m o s t  s t r i k i n g  
pari a b o u t  ( i s s i n g e r ' s  e x p l a n a t i o n  Is that it e n d s  in 1970, 
w 1 11 * A l l e n d e ' s  i n a u g u r a t i o n . He d e n i e s  that a n y  aid w a s  
g i v e n  to G e n e r a l  A u g u s t o  P i n o c h e t  in 1973, a n d  c l a i m s  that 
the c o u p  w a s  a n  i n d i g e n o u s  o c c u r r e n c e .^  T h e  v a l i d i t y
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o f  thi s  s t a t e m e n t  is not as i m p o r t a n t  as K i s s i n g e r ' s  c o m ­
p l e t e  lack of r e f e r e n c e  to t h e  C I A ' s  c o v e r t  a c t i v i t i e s  from 
1 9 7 0 - 7 3 .  His c h a p t e r  on C h i l e  s i m p l y  e n d s ,  thu s  i m p l y i n g  
th e  end to a n y  U.S. i n v o l v e m e n t  a f t e r  1 9 7 0 ,  B a s e d  on  e v i ­
d e n c e  of the S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  thi s  is e n t i r e l y  u n t r u e .  It 
h a s  b e e n  s a i d  b y  p e o p l e  d i r e c t l y  i n v o l v e d  w i t h  T r a c k  IT 
th a t  a l t h o u g h  n o  o n e  a d m i t t e d  it, K i s s i n g e r  a n d  N i x o n  w a n t e d  
A l l e n d e  a s s a s s i n a t e d , ^ ^  A l t h o u g h  the C I A ' s  c o v e r t  a c t i v i t y  
a l o n e  d i d  n o t  a l l o w  the c o u p  o f  1 9 7 3  to o c c u r ,  it c l e a r l y  
p r e d i s p o s e d  t h e  A l l e n d e  g o v e r n m e n t  to f a i l u r e ,
le r a t i o n a l e  b e h i n d  the a c t i o n s  o f  the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
g o v e r n m e n t  in C h i l e  is a c o m p l e x  an d  a m b i g i o u s  s u b j e c t .  It 
is d i f f i c u l t  to d i s t i n g u i s h  b e t w e e n  the t r u e  m o t i v e s  of the 
p r o t a g o n i s t s  a n d  the r e p o r t e d  o n e s .  It is e v e n  m o r e  d i f f i ­
c u l t  to d i s c e r n  w h e r e  the l o c u s  o f  a u t h o r i t y  , that is, 
w h e t h e r  it r e s t e d  w i t h  the C I A ,  the 4 0  C o m m i t t e e ,  or  the 
P r e s i d e n t .  If the w o r d s  o f  t h o s e  c l o s e l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a . e  to be t r u s t e d ,  then a s t a t e m e n t  b y  H e n r y  
K i s s i n g e r  s e e m s  to b e  the p r e v a l e n t  a t t i t u d e  an d  j u s t i f i ­
c a t i o n  for th e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s '  i n v o l v e m e n t  in C h i l e .
K i s s i n g e r  sai d ,  "I d o n ' t  s e e  w h y  we h a v e  to lee a c o u n t r y  g o  
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T h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  i n v o l v e m e n t  in p r o p a -  
e f f o r t s  »olitir ! e n H  , an d  m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n s  in 
Ch i e i m ed t o  ring n >,u the e v e n t u a l  o v e r t h r o w  o f
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the Alleride government, fiach separate aspect of the CIA's 
actions had one purpose in mind--to keep Allende and his 
Marxist government from running Chile. Despite Kissinger's 
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CHAPTER I I I
THE END OK CHILEAN DEMOCRACY
Through a combination of Internal political and eco­
nomic problems, and external intervention by the United 
States government, the Allende government soon collapsed. 
The events leading up to the 1973 coup clearly illustrate 
the dramatic tension which existed within the Chilean polit 
leal system from 1970-73, After Allende was elected, the 
United States' policy towards Chile began to stress more 
economic intervention and manipulation, which the United 
States government believed would eventually lead to 
Allende's downfall.^ A brief chronicle of the events prior 
to September 11, 1973 illustrates how a democratically elec 
ted government could be brought to a standstill,and over­
thrown by a small group of men with relative ease.
Once Allende was elected and the United States govern­
ment realized that they could not prevent him from taking 
office, the policy of the United States government towards 
Chile changed. The November 9, 1970 National Security 
Decision Memo (NSDM) #93, stated that the new policy toward 
Chile would be publically cool and economically hostile.2 
This policy consisted of limiting private investment in 
Chile, terminating former economic agreements, persuading
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other institutions not to lend money to Chile, and telling 
American companies that they should not do business with 
Chile,® Before Allende took control of the government, the 
World Band had lent Chile over $234 million, but after 
Alende took office, no loans were made.^ The United States 
government instigated (through the CIA) and supported many 
of the strikes which ultimately crippled the economy.-* 
Clearly, the strikers would not have been able to exist for 
as long as they did without assistance.
The role of the CIA in Chile after 1970 was slightly 
different from that of previous years. By 1971, the CIA was 
planning various coup efforts which did not materialize.
The main function of the CIA from 1971-73 was to collect 
intelligence information which would be invaluable to the 
people who would eventually overthrow Allende.® The CIA 
composed lists of names of people who supported the Allende 
government and who would have to be arrested, killed, or de­
ported after the coup. The CIA spent much time and effort 
in trying to undermine the Chilean government, and even 
asked Australian Intelligence to aid them in their propa­
ganda efforts.^ Although officials of the United States 
government (Kissinger and Nixon) deny any involvement in the 
1973 coup, insiders report that Track II (military solution) 
did not end in 1970.® Colonel Wimert, who helped arrange 
the Schneider kidnapping, claims that there were undercover
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CIA agents in Chile (false flaggers) whose purpose was to 
assassinate Allende.^ This brings up the highly controver­
sial issue of political assassinations. Althcugh officials 
in the United States government categorically deny any at­
tempt to assassinate Allende ever existed, insiders say that 
various assassination strategies were planned, and as one 
source said, ’Henry [Kissinger] wanted it."^ Although the 
United States government claimed to use only economic sanc­
tions, covert political and military actions were also being 
carried out.
Although the United States played an important role in 
the downfall of the Allende government, there were also in­
ternal political problems which made the overthrow inevi­
table. Between 1970-73, several long strikes halted the 
economy and escalated social tension. By 1973, the insecur­
ity of the people was evidenced by their forming of private 
police forces, and their building up of personal armies.^ 
The volatile period called the tancaso, consisted of the 
period after the military officers resigned from Allende's 
cabinet (they were brought in to help strengthen the govern­
ment's position) and the abortive coup attempt of June 29,
1973.^ During the tancaso period, the economy was 
virtually at a standstill, and the disunity within the 
political real- was at its highest point.^ Allende 
completely alienated the PDC, who had become exceedingly
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hostile to the leftist (socialist) taction of the UP. Per­
haps Allende's biggest mistake was his refusal to join with 
the PDC and cut his ties with the far left.^ The socialist 
faction of the UP would not reconcile with the PDC and the 
country soon ceased to have a functioning government. There 
were constant legislative and constitutional disputes in 
which the Congress accused the UP government of acting il­
legally. During this time (July, 1973), the political in­
stability was compounded by a second truckers' strike and a 
middle class (professional) sympathy strike.^ Although 
Allende tried to reconcile the various factions, he could 
not bring order to a country which was quickly becoming more 
and more unstable.
Perhaps the most significant event in this unstable 
period was the one over which Allende had no control. On 
June 29, 1973, General Carlos Prats put down an abortive 
coup attempt by a faction of the Chilean armyJ6 When 
General Prats resigned on August 22, 1973, the stage was 
finally set for the eventual coup.^ Perhaps the most 
ironic aspect of this situation was the fact that Allende's 
nemesis was caused by his own party. In early September, 
Carlos Altamirano, the Socialist Party Secretary General, 
openly declared war on the Chilean military in a public 
statement,without Allende's knowledge or permission.^ It 
was at this point that the Chilean army, under its new head,
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General Augusto Pinochet, decided to act against the govern­
ment.^ After Allende heard Altamirano’s speech, he decided 
that he would ask for a plebiscite in order to end the polit­
ical impasse.2° Allende was not able to give his plebiscite 
speech, for on September 11, 1973, the day planned for the 
speech, Allende was occupied with other matters.^
In the early morning of September 11, 1973, the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the armed forces, General Augusto 
Pinochet, had surrounded La Moneda, the presidential palace 
and home of the Allende government.^3 According to an eye­
witness account, Allende organized the defense of La Moneda, 
a force which consisted of only a few Allende supporters, 
since most of the Palace Guard had fled.^ Allende and his 
supporters refused to surrender, and the shooting and bomb­
ings lasted throughout the morning. ^  After much gunfire 
was exchanged, the army was finally able to gain entrance to 
the building and the fighting continued within La Moneda.
At 1:50 p.m., near the halls of the Red Room, Allende and 
his supporters were surrounded by rebel forces who demanded 
Allende's surrender. Allende then said, "Never. It is bet­
ter to leave dead than surrender."26 At this moment, gun­
fire was exchanged, mortally wounding President Allende.2? 
The military junta's version of the coup is quite different. 
They claim t h a t  a military car was on route to pick up 
Allv n d e  to discuss a surrender plan with Pinochet, hut the
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car was held up by sniper fire. They also claim that when 
they reached Allende, he had already committed suicide. ^  
Perhaps the most moving account of the final hours at 
La Moneda comes from Allende'$ farewell speech to the 
nation. He said:
In the face of these facts, the only thing 
left for me to say to the workers: 1 will not 
resign! Placed in historical transition, I 
will pay with my life for the loyalty of the 
people••.workers of my country: I have faith
in Chile and her destiny.... Probably Radio 
Magalienes will be silenced, and the calm 
metal of my voice will not reach you. It 
does not matter. You will continue to hear 
me, I will always be beside you or at least 
*ny memory will be that of a dignified man, 
that of a man who was loyal.™
How Allende died is not as important as what his death
represented--that is, the end of Chilean democracy.
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CONCLUSION
There are a multiplicity of factors which were respon­
sible for the overthrow of the Allende government. It is 
difficult to guess whether or not the internal divisions 
within the Chilean political scene were strong enough to 
guarantee Allende's downfall. It would be fair to say that 
the actions of the United States government created an at­
mosphere in which a coup was a constant and real threat.
The most significant aspect of the Allende years was that it 
epitomized the policy of the United States government 
towards Latin America,
The two basic assumptions that the leaders of the 
United States government held about Chile were that the 
United States had a right to interfere with Allende's 
government, and that the Chileans themselves were incapable 
of solving their own political problems. These assumptions 
clearly demonstrate the United States government's notion 
that the entire American continent revolves around the 
United States' wishes and policies. In Chile, the United 
States believed that it had a vested interest in removing 
the Marxist government of Salvador Allende, Allende was one 
of the first elected Marxist presidents in the hemisphere's 
history, and the United States felt that its political and 
military hegemony was being threatened. Clearly, a
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government which planned to nationalize many United States' 
companies directly threatened many business interests in the 
United States, It would seem that the main concern in this 
situation was economic, with anti-communist rhetoric (some 
genuine) added to justify American intervention. Perhaps 
the greatest hyprocrisy lies in the fact that the United 
States government used the threat of communism in order to 
protect specific economic interests.
The most intolerable aspect of the United States' in­
tervention lies in the attitudes of those involved. 
Kissinger, Nixon, and Helms did not believe that the 
Chileans were capable of choosing their own government. The 
United States government was oblivious to the internal mach­
inations of the Chilean political realm, and made decisions 
based on inaccurate assumptions. The person most attuned to 
Chilean politics, Ambassador Edward Korry, was excluded from 
most of the decisions concerning Chile. As soon as the CIA 
became aware of the Internal political dissention in Chile, 
they offered aid to these factions who were willing to use 
the CIA's help to further their own ends. These covert 
operations by the CIA were based on the assumption that the 
United States' actions were necessary to create a reasonable 
solution to the Allende problem. The idea that the indig­
enous populations in Latin American countries are Incapable 
of running their own governments is a prevalent attitude of
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the United States government which causes considerable re­
sentment of Americans among all the classes in the countries 
south of the Rio Grande,
The United States' involvement in Chile from 1970-73 is 
not an abstract, isolated incident. The underlying ideas 
behind the United States government's foreign policy towards 
Chile is still evident today. The United States' covert and 
overt intervention in Latin America has occurred in the 
past, is occurring in the present, and will most likely con­
tinue in the future. The United States' policies in 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and other Latin American and 
Caribbean countries clearly illustrate that many of the same 
tenets concerning American foreign policy still exist today. 
The United States is a country which advocates popular elec­
tions, democracy, human rights and freedom. The hypocrisy 
of the Chilean involvement revolves around the fact that 
Allende represented an American ideal--a democratically 
elected president who respected civil liberties and a free 
press. In the case of Chile, the United States government 
had to compromise its values to protect what it believed to 
be the best national interest. By helping to depose 
Allende, the United States clearly stated that it does not 
favor democratic governments, but rather, governments which 
are favorable to the United States and which do not threaten 
the economic and political hegemony of the United States,
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In the end, the United States government did not get what it 
wanted, which was a conservative government which appeared 
to be democratic and which promoted American interests.
There is no possible way that the United States government 
could call the military dictatorship of General Pinochet 
democratic, or concerned with human rights and freedom.
With the help of the United States government, the Chilean 
military was able to end a tradition of a constitutional and 
democratic government which had existed for over 140 years* 
The tragedy of the Allende government offers concrete prooi 
that a re-definitiu of American foreign policy and rela­
tions with Latin America must be made in order to create an 
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